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Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity
Under the Civil Rights Act: How About
Cease and Desist Powers?
INTRODUCTION
In spite of its being emphasized in the Declaration of Independence,
equality as a right guaranteed by government has not received the ju-
dicial recognition necessary to transform the concept into a workable
reality. Historically, England had no such declaration or institution,1
and there was no expression of general equality in the Constitution
until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its inclusion was
primarily motivated by the demand for just treatment of the Negro,
and the focus of judicial scrutiny regarding this ideal today relates es-
sentially to racial issues. Nevertheless, it is now well settled that this
protection extends to all races, and individuals. 2
Throughout our history, the law has been basically indifferent in
promoting practical equality. In the legislative realm, this attitude
changed with the "New Deal" of the 1930's, especially in the area of
labor law, but judicially, the reformation did not occur until the now
famous case of Brown v. Board of Education.3 Generally speaking,
most Americans have come to realize that the desire for equality is not
merely a racial concept; that each of us is frequently in a minority of
some kind. Increasing legislation intended to secure equal treatment
for all persons, together with the broadening application of existing
laws to innumerable circumstances, combined with the potent provi-
sions of the Constitution demonstrates our hope and faith in the law
and government to assist us in attaining a most basic right.4 A dynamic
1. Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality, 12 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv.
182 (1955).
2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Kellet, The Expansion of Equality, 37 So. CALIF. L. REv. 400, 424 (1964).
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method which the government may utilize to promote, expand, and
realize the elusive goal of equality in employment opportunity is
urgently needed. Under presently existing legislation the concept of
equal employment opportunity is primarily the concern of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5
RELATIONSHIP OF LAW AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
Employment discrimination is a major cause 6 contributing to the
disadvantaged economic and social status7 of Negroes and all minori-
ties in America. The late President Kennedy in his message to Con-
gress requesting passage of the Civil Rights Act remarked:
Racial discrimination in employment is especially injurious to its
victims and to the national economy. It results in a great waste of
human resources and creates serious community problems. It is
moreover, inconsistent with the democratic principle that no man
should be denied employment commensurate with his abilities be-
cause of his race or creed or ancestry.8
The Council of Economic Advisors has estimated that we are losing 17
billion dollars a year in our gross national product as the result of ra-
cial discrimination.9 Of those forms of discrimination which are the
target of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 discrimination in employment
is the most widespread and undoubtedly the most harmful to society.
The cumulative effect of patterns of discrimination in employment is
to impose permanent disabilities on Negroes and members of other
minority groups, to embitter them, to waste their talents, to divert
5. Subchapter VII protects all people exercising their right to obtain employment, as
well as participating in unions in industries affecting interstate commerce. 78 Stat. 241,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
6. On the relation between employment discrimination and the deprived economic
status of Negroes, see, M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA, 61-81 (1962); Hearings on
H.R. 405, and other bills relating to Equal Employment Opportunity Before the
General Subcommittee On Labor of the House Committee On Education and Labor, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 176, 181 (1963) (statement of Julius Hobson, then Chairman, Washington
CORE).
7. On the economic status of Negroes, see, The Economic Situation of Negroes in the
U.S., DEP'T or LABOR BuL., No. s-3 (Supps. 1960 & 1961); and the 1963 House Hearings
on Equal Employment Opportunity, supra note 6.
8. 109 CONG. REC. 3248 (1963).
9. Council of Economic Advisors, Cost of Racial Discrimination, Sept. 25, 1962.
10. Subchapter I, strengthens the protection by the Federal Government of voting
rights; Subchapter II, prohibits the denial of equal treatment in places of public
accommodation; Subchapter III, IV, VI, protects all people in exercising their rights to
obtain governmental facilities, and public education. 78 Stat. Ann. 241, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1971 (1964).
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their energies into harmful directions, and to estrange them from our
cultural life." What then is the relationship of law to this problem of
equal employment opportunity?
Any inquiry in this area must commence from a recognition of three
basic facts:
First - that of discrimination in American life-some of it
willful and bigoted; most of it unwitting and flowing
from well established patterns of business and commu-
nity behavior;
Second - that of the desire of business, labor, and the general
community to promote racial harmony, and equal em-
ployment opportunity. This fact is no less real or signif-
icant than the fact of discrimination itself;
Third - it must be realized that a substantial number of minor-
ity group workers are underqualified for jobs offered by
industries-underqualified but qualifiable.12
Broadly speaking, three views on the question of the proper role of
law in the equal employment opportunity problem have been vehe-
mently debated for a number of years.' 3 One view holds that this is an
area in which the application of the law is inappropriate because such
a law is unconstitutional, unworkable, or undesirable.' 4 Another con-
tention is that the law is a panacea for the problems of groups which
suffer from discrimination and that enforcement of equal employment
legislation is the key to a prompt solution.15 Lastly, some argue that
while the role of law is limited, it may be used as an effective tool in
gradually eliminating, to some extent, unreasonable discrimination in
employment practices.' 6 It is submitted that the law, which has the
traditional role as the protector of vested interests, should also adopt
the role as an innovator of change in the quest for equality in employ-
ment opportunity. The law has too often been viewed by minorities,
especially the poor, as the tool of the oppressors in society. Landlords,
loan sharks, businessmen specializing in shady installment credit plans
are represented by counsel on a fairly permanent basis. But who has
11. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964).
12. Remarks by F. D. Roosevelt, Jr., 7 B.C. IND. Se CoM. L. REv. 413 (1966).
13. See CONG. Q. SERV., Revolution in Civil Rights, 3-5, 21-25, 35, 36, 38 (1965).
14. See 110 CONG. REc. 13077 (1964) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
15. See note 6, supra.
16. Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM.
L. REv. 417 (1966).
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represented and spoken for tenants, debtors, and consumers?17 The
true force of the law which is its capacity to initiate change and its
flexibility to accept and to mold change is a major factor in society to-
day.' The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for the first time employs modern
government processes to protect the interests of members of minority
groups. In a legal sense, minority group members now have a vested
interest protected by legislation in an equal employment opportunity.
Thus, the law may serve both the traditional role as the great protector
of vested interests and the dynamic role of the great innovator of
change in its search for equality.
Ostensibly, whenever a particular law fails in its traditional role,
necessity commands that new methods of attaining desirable ends be
adopted. Presently, Title VII has been a colossal failure in eradicating
discrimination in employment. This can be primarily attributed to
the lack of effective enforcement powers under Title VII. The time
has come for change.
THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENFORCEMENT SCHEME OF TITLE VII
The principal enforcement responsibility under Title VII has been
assigned to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission created
by § 705.19 The chief responsibilities granted to the Commission are
the investigation and conciliation of complaints, the promulgation of
record keeping requirements, and the participation in a variety of co-
operative efforts to further voluntary compliance with the law. Fur-
thermore, the Commission plays a significant role as interpretor of
Title VII's provisions. Notwithstanding its authority under § 709 (c)
and (d) to require the keeping of records and reports, such activity
amounts to nothing greater than issuing procedural regulations. It has
no quasi-legislative power with respect to substantive rights and obli-
gations. However, on the other hand, the Commission must interpret
the scope of Title VII in order to properly dispense with cases arising
thereunder, and § 713 (b) specifically provides for good faith reliance
17. Marshall, Law and the Quest for Equality, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
18. Id. at 9.
19. The Commission consists of 5 members each appointed for staggered terms by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of the
Commissioners can be members of the same political party. The Chairman and Vice-
Chairman are designated by the President. The Chairman is responsible for the adminis-
trative operations of thee Commission and the appointment of personnel. See note 11
supra, at 81.
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on a formal Commission interpretation as a defense to a charge of an
unlawful employment practice. Eventually, Commission interpreta-
tions may have some legal effect in the courts even though they lack
the full force of the law behind them. Moreover, Commission inter-
pretations may come to be regarded as a body of experience and in-
formed judgement to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance.20
Complaint procedure: The machinery of the Commission com-
mences with the filing of a written charge of unlawful discrimination.
The charge must be duly filed within 90 days after the occurrence of
the alleged discrimination. 21 Upon receipt of the charge the Commis-
sion initiates an investigation and if it determines there is "reasonable
cause" to believe a violation has occurred, it endeavors to eliminate
the unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. If the Commission is unable to obtain
voluntary compliance through these informal methods, the aggrieved
party may seek relief by suit in the Federal Court.
The number of criticisms which can be leveled at the above enforce-
ment proceedings are innumerable.22 Most criticisms may be properly
discussed in other individual articles because of the necessity to analyze
in depth those deficiencies. Nevertheless, the following criticisms illus-
trate the most significant problems with the Civil Rights Act enforce-
ment methods.
CRITICISMS OF THE COMMISSION'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
The Commission, as it presently exists, is not authorized to con-
duct an investigation in the absence of a formal charge. This is a se-
rious flaw since experience demonstrates that administrative agencies
achieve more positive results through broad investigative procedures
of employment patterns and practices than through methods designed
to accomplish the resolution of individual complaints. 23 Indeed, the
20. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, § 5.03.
21. Such a charge may be fied by the person aggrieved or by a Commission where
he has reasonable cause to believe a violation of the title has occurred. The Commission
is not authorized to conduct an investigation in the absence of a formal charge. See note
11 supra, at 82.
22. See generally, Symposium on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 7 B.C. IND. & COM L. REV.
413 (1966).
23. NoRcrEN AND HILL, TOwARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT 108-110 (1964); Powers, Federal
Procurement and Equal Employment Opportunity, 29 LAW & ConfEmr. PROB. 468, 484-85
(1964).
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individual complaint process is very slow and laborious, and usually
does not change the racial employment pattern of a company or in-
dustry.24
Harold Baron of the Chicago Urban League commented in his ex-
cellent study on Negro unemployment that:
Statutory remedies that rely on individual complaints by ag-
grieved parties are slow and permit many subtle subterfuges on
the part of the discriminators. Relatively few individuals receive
better jobs or housing under the protection of these measures, and
the basic pattern of second class citizenship remains unchanged. 25
The Federal government should have learned from the lessons of the
past, that given the significant developments of the American economy
during the last 20 years, those states with Fair Employment Practice
Commissions (FEPC), upon which the federal legislation was mod-
eled, have seriously failed to erase employment discrimination. Sig-
nificantly, during the spring and summer of 1963 and 1964, the largest
and most dramatic public demonstrations against job discrimination
occurred in states with FEPC laws such as New York, Pennsylvania,
and California. It is noteworthy that Negro unemployment in those
states is among the highest in the nation.26
History bears out the fact that administrative agencies need broad
investigative powers to be effective, otherwise, they are destined for
obsolescence in the graveyard of bureaucratic red-tape. The result is
that the agency stands as an insurmountable roadblock to the attain-
ment of the ideal for which it was created. This should not, and can
not be allowed to happen to the EEOC.
The most glaring deficiency of Title VII's enforcement scheme is
the concept of voluntary compliance by businessmen and labor unions
to the Commission's rulings and the respective provisions of the Civil
Rights Act. Citizens may justifiably question why the government
created such a costly administrative agency designed merely to inform
business people and labor unions of their possible unlawful conduct,
when other methods, such as moral suasion are available, would prob-
ably attain better results, and are notably cheaper. Voluntary compli-
ance simply means that the government is requesting that the
"violators" obey the law. Nevertheless, if the law is not obeyed, unlike
24. Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions; A Critical
Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. R v. 22 (1964).
25. Baron, Negro Unemployment, A Case Study, 3 NEw UNIV. THOUGHT 42 (1963).
26. Hill, supra note 24.
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other "wrongdoers", no legal sanctions will result. This enforcement
procedure, amounts to nothing more than a slap on the wrist. The
procedure is unfair to both the aggrieved party and businessmen alike.
The unfairness exists because feelings, prejudice, and discrimination
are deeply rooted, frequently taking forms so subtle that the perpetra-
tor is unaware of his discriminatory conduct. To believe that with one
great sweep of its hand, the law, absent stringent enforcement guide-
lines and powers, can overcome these deep-seated hatreds is ludicrous
and a blatant disregard of human nature. A mandatory compliance
plan is urgently needed to put teeth into the enforcement scheme of
the Civil Rights Act.
Two of the most formidable deficiencies of leaving an important
part of the enforcement process to private individuals is their inability
to finance the legal actions, and the self-imposed inhibitions which
grow out of fear of personal reprisal. Title VII has committed to
private individuals the last step in the enforcement process--court
action. The Commission's conciliation services are free, being financed
by the government .27 However, court action can be maintained at the
expense of the government only when it is brought by the Attorney
General as a pattern or practice suit, or if the Attorney General elects
to intervene in the individual's action.28
It is indeed hard, if not impossible, to accurately measure to the
fullest extent the effect of these two factors. It would appear certain,
however, that after many years of exposure to discriminatory practices,
the victim is not likely to believe that all or even a few of the wrongs
of the past, are now going to be corrected by a legislative enactment
lacking the full force of the law behind his effort. Title VII represents
a mere token effort to aid minority group members in securing equal
employment opportunities. As a result, it would appear that fear of
personal reprisal, more than any other single factor, looms as the
greatest obstacle for the complainant to overcome. Also, it is naive
to assume that an individual lacking adequate financial resources will
seek legal aid in an effort to redress his grievance. It goes without
saying that few, if any, practicing attorneys are willing to perform
27. Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and
Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 495, 501 (1966).
28. The first suit was noted in 61 LAB. REL. Rap. 102 (1966). The statute eases the
economic burdens on private persons who conduct enforcement litigation by allowing
a court to do the following: (1) appoint an attorney for the complainant; (2) authorize
commencement of the action "without payment of fees, costs, or security"; and (3) award
an attorney's fee to the complainant if he prevails. Walker, supra note 27, at 501.
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their services gratuitously. Undoubtedly, the practical advantages will
lie heavily with the defendants. Even where the evidence of discrimi-
nation is overwhelming in favor of the plaintiff, it cannot be antici-
pated that many complainants will undertake the heavy burdens of
individual suit.
The objective of any law is to right some wrong, or eliminate some
evil which threatens the interest of the public. Laws are designed to
do the most good for the greatest number of people. However, Title
VII contradicts this purpose by depriving the Commission of adequate
control over the conciliation proceedings. Since suit is -brought, if at
all, by the aggrieved party, the result of conciliation necessarily takes
the form of a settlement satisfactory to the complainant alone, while
the public interest in eliminating the discriminatory practice goes
unprotected.29 The few remedies offered under § 706 are purely
personal in nature and have little or no effect on the public interest
as a whole.
Another deplorable aspect of the Commission's functioning, as it
presently exists, is that the total enforcement procedure is too cumber-
some; it permits valid claims to become stale, since frequently, several
years intervene before a decision is reached. Indeed, during Congres-
sional debates on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Humphrey stated that
it seems clear in view of the structure of Title VII and the time table
imposed by § 706 that the complainant may not bring suit without
first proceeding through the Commission.30 In the first six months of
the Commission's operations, more than 3000 charges were filed
alleging discrimination.3' Since then, the case load has not been allevi-
ated to any significant degree, while a backlog of cases continues to
mount. It is not unusual that a charging party may wait two to three
years before a Commission decision is eventually rendered.
Certain deficiencies are injurious to both the employee and the
employer. For example, the evidentiary requirement of "reasonable
cause" to believe a violation of the Civil Rights Act has occurred,
which must be shown before the Commission will initiate any action
toward conciliation, conference, or persuasion, does not even necessi-
tate the procurement and promulgation of sufficient evidence to
constitute a prima facie violation against the employer. Furthermore,
29. Berg, supra note 11, at 86.
30. 110 CONG. Ric. 13694 (1964).
31. Roosevelt, Introduction, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 413 (1966).
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this often leads to granting the benefit of the doubt to the complainant
in questionable cases. The end result is an unnecessary harassment of
businesses and a multiplicity of superficial claims. Rules of evidence
requiring a greater burden of proof are badly needed. By comparison,
it may be noted that in proceedings before the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, essential matters must be established by a clear prepon-
derance of the evidence,3 2 while essential findings must be supported
by substantial evidence.3 3 In the interest of fundamental fairness to
all parties concerned, justice demands at least a traditional minimum
evidentiary standard in such crucial matters as arise under the Act.
Title VII is geared to guarantee equal employment opportunity in
the job market to all people regardless of race, color, sex, national
origin, or religion. The Act attempts to limit employers to consider
only things such as performance, potential, ability, efficiency and
capacity as determinative factors in hiring procedures. The ascertain-
ment of this goal depends in large measure on whether or not the
law was effectively drafted.3 4 Suggested criteria have been submitted
from prominent authorities on how to judge the merits of a statutory
scheme designed to eradicate unreasonable discrimination in employ-
ment.35 The most important criterion for our purposes is that the
statutory scheme should be calculated to effectuate a speedy considera-
tion of employment problems, eliminating every unnecessary obstacle
to remedial action. The importance of quick action cannot be over-
emphasized. One who is the victim of discrimination cannot wait
forever to regain his job. He must earn a living immediately and even
an award of back pay from the date of the alleged violation will not
settle the problem of meeting current living expenses. It is self-evident
that the enforcement proceedings of Title VII when measured on the
above standard lack significant merit. A dramatic renovation is ur-
gently needed in the enforcement structure. A potent addition would
be the conferring of cease and desist powers on the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission.
32. NLRB v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 362 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1966); Iowa Beef Packers,
Inc. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964); Eastern Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 131
(4th Cir. 1949).
33. NLRB v. Mt. Vernon Tel. Corp., 352 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Elias
Brothers Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Crosby Chemicals, Inc.,
274 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1960).
34. Cooksey, supra note 16, at 421.
35. Id. at 421; see also statement of Hon. John F. Henning, Under Secretary of Labor,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 100 (1963).
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THE NATURE OF CEASE AND DESIST POWERS
In its original form, Title VII drew heavily from the National
Labor Relations Act.36 It was first proposed that the Civil Rights Act
would create a Commission which like the National Labor Relations
Board had quasi-judicial powers and authority to issue cease and desist
orders enforceable by the courts. In forming its orders and seeking
their enforcement the NLRB asserts the public interest in the preven-
tion of unfair labor practices,3 7 while the availability to the individual
party of certain remedies is secondary as simply a mode of effectuating
the public policy of the Act.38 However, due to a legislative leadership
compromise while the original bill was in Committee, the NLRA
pattern was trimmed and the emphasis shifted to the resolution of
individual grievances. 39
In order to ascertain the exact nature of cease and desist powers, a
brief analysis of the NLRB and its use of this power is relevant not
only because of the similarity in the proposed statutory enforcement
scheme suggested herein, but also, because such a probe will ade-
quately demonstrate the effectiveness of this methodology, which if
properly employed and structured could breath new life into the
Civil Rights Act and Title VII, both of which are rapidly losing
vitality.
Under the NLRA, the NLRB has the power to order persons found
to have committed unfair labor practices to cease and desist from
employing those practices. 40 To the alleged violator this means that
the character of his previous actions are to cease, and from such con-
duct the employer is to desist.41 The propriety and breadth of the
order depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.42
The classic test for the proper use of a cease and desist order is
whether the board might reasonably conclude from the evidence that
such an order is necessary to prevent the employer from engaging in
36. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151-168.
37. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940); Amalgamated Utility
Workers (C.I.O.) v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 309 U.S. 261, 265-68 (1940).
1 38. NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1942); Waterman v.
S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 760, 761 (5th Cir. 1941).
39. Berg, supra note 11, at 85.
40. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLRB v. Swift &
Co., 108 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Folk Corp., 102 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1939).
41. NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Line, Inc., 106 F.2d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 1939).
42. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941); NLRB v. Swift & Co., 108
F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1940).
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an unfair labor practice.43 It has also been held by the NLRB that
the scope of the order is to be measured by the character and extent
of the employer's past conduct.44
When the board has made a determination that an unfair labor
practice has been committed, it frequently includes in its order a
provision commanding the employer to cease and desist "from in any
manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the
exercise of the rights of self organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose
of collective bargaining ... as guaranteed by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. ' 45 This provision has been labeled by judges and legal
authors alike as the NLRB's "blanket clause. '46 It is submitted that
through the vehicle of this clause, the NLRB has wide latitude in
determining the scope of its cease and desist orders. Such a weapon is
extremely valuable in pursuing the purposes of acts such as the NLRA
and the Civil Rights Act.
The language of § 10 (c) states that:
If the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in
the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, then the Board ... shall issue and cause to be
served on such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter.
43. May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); Bon-R Reproductions,
Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1962).
44. NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942).
45. NLRB ANN. RFP. 140-141 (1937).
46. The "blanket clause" is justified on the following ground: Section 8 (a) (1) of the
NLRA provides, "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
Section 10 (a) empowers the board "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice (listed in Section 8)." The board's complaint usually alleges, inter alia,
the unfair labor practice of violating section 8 (a) (1). Section 10 (c) empowers the
board to issue an order requiring the employer to cease and desist from such unfair
labor practice. Indeed, this statutory authorization presents a compelling argument and
is a strong basis upon which to justify the "blanket clause." See, Note, The Scope of
NLRB Cease and Desist Orders: Contempt Proceedings Against the Employer, 53 HAitv.
L. REV. 472, 475 (1940).
Cases illustrative of situations where the board's broad orders were upheld include:
Precision Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 567, (2d Cir. 1953), where the board's
order that an employer cease and desist from "in any other manner" violating the NLRA
was not too broad as going beyond violations specifically found to have occurred in view
of the employer's past conduct. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
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This means that the Board must issue a cease and desist order once it
has held a hearing and determined that a prohibited practice exists.47
Notwithstanding this fact, the Board is granted some latitude of dis-
cretion in the formulation of affirmative provisions which will effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. It is for the Board, not the courts, to
determine how the effect of prior unfair labor practices may be ex-
punged,48 yet the Board's power in this respect is still subject to the
court's control under § 10.49 The court's power of review over a simple
cease and desist order is necessarily more limited, for whatever may
be the broader policies of the Act, the compelling policy which the
courts may not thwart is the Congressional plan and purpose that
certain acts are illegal and must be enjoined.50
The Supreme Court has held that the Board's order should stand
unless it can be demonstrated that it is a "patent attempt" to achieve
ends other than those which can be fairly said to effectuate the policies
of the Act.5 ' Some courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that
the administration of the NLRA was granted to the Board and not to
the judges of the Courts of Appeals. 52 The Act is administered by a
group of men whose constant, day-to-day rapport with problems of
labor relations gives them a unique feeling for appropriate solutions
to novel questions in the field. For this reason, their solutions are
accorded great weight when questioned before judges who usually
lack the familiarity.53
The Board's power to issue cease and desist orders is analogous to
the power of an equity court to issue an injunction.54 An injunction
is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case command-
ing an act which the court regards as essential to justice, or restraining
of North America, AFL Local 88 v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the court held
that the NLRB may fashion an order that not only prohibits actions specifically found
to be illegal but also activities which are of a somewhat different nature and which
might be resorted to in an attempt to circumvent the board's purpose. Finally in the
case of NLRB v. Moore Dry Kiln Co., 320 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1963), the court held that the
language of the cease and desist order was properly employed in light of evidence of an
attitude in opposition, by the employer, to the purposes of the Act in general, even
though the order included a statement of all the rights guaranteed in section 7.
47. Eichleay Corp. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1953).
48. International Association of Machinists; Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 35, etc.
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
49. May Department Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
50. NLRB v. Gonzalez Padlin Co., 161 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1947); Eichleay Corp. v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1953).
51. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
52. NLRB v. Kingston Cake Co., 206 F.2d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 1953).
53. Id.
54. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941); NLRB v. Win. Tehel
Bottling Co., 129 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1942).
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an act which it deems contrary to equity and good conscience. 55 The
function or purpose of an injunction is to restrain action or inter-
ference of some kind, to furnish preventive relief against irreparable
injury, or to preserve the status quo.56 Significantly, a cease and desist
order is not only in the nature of an injunction, but it has been held
and is now generally accepted that the affirmative provisions of a
cease and desist order are analogous to those of a mandatory injunc-
tion.57
The innate power of a mandatory injunction renders it very attrac-
tive in fulfilling the legislative purpose proposed in Title VII. Un-
like a prohibitory injunction, which is primarily designed to correct
a wrong of the past in the sense of a redress for injuries already
sustained, the design of a mandatory injunction, simply stated, is to
prevent further injury not only to private interests, but also the
public interests concerned.58 It is an extraordinary remedial process
resorted to usually for the accomplishment of full and complete
justice, but most importantly for our purposes, it commands the
performance of some positive act.5 9
Indeed, the difference between a prohibitory injunction and a
mandatory injunction can be tenuous. Recognizing this fact, several
courts have fashioned a test for ascertaining the proper character of
a mandatory injunction. For the purpose of determining whether the
effect of an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory the result of the
enforcement of the writ on the defendant must be considered; if it
compels him affirmativly to surrender a position which he holds, and
which on the facts alleged by him, he is entitled to maintain, it is
mandatory.60 Moreover, an injunction is mandatory if it has the effect
of compelling performance of a substantive act and necessarily con-
templates change in relative position or the rights of the parties at the
time the injunction is granted or the decree is entered. 61 A mandatory
injunction may be granted even though the act complained of has
been completed before suit is brought. The complainant, by this
55. See generally, 43 C.JS. Injunctions § 1, (1945).
56. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, P.2d 397 (1936).
57. NLRB v. Win. Tehel Bottling Co., 129 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1942).
58. Troe v. Larson, 84 Iowa 649, 51 N.W. 179 (1892).
59. Ohaver v. Fenech, 206 Cal. 118, 273 P. 555, (1928); Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla.
253, 103 So. 625 (1925).
60. Growers Warehousing Corp. v. W. E. Sawyer Tobacco Co., 5 Tenn. App. 619
(1900).
61. Pomin v. Superior Court in and for El Dorado County, 112 P.2d 17, 44 Cal. App.
2d 206 (1941).
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means, may be returned to the status quo ante.62 Where the defendant
has fully completed the act sought to be restrained after the bill for
relief has been filed but before the issuance of any order, the court
has the power to compel by mandatory injunction the restoration of
the former conditions of things and therefore prevent the unfair gain
of an advantage by virtue of a wrongful act.63
The scope of remedial orders is important since, unlike violations
of the statute, violations of the Board's orders when enforced by ju-
dicial decree may be punished as contempt.6 4 The Board has broad
power to determine the necessary scope of the cease and desist order
and decide what relief is appropriate.6 5 Its remedial order may be
designed to make whole someone who has been deprived of a recog-
nized interest by acts which constitute a violation of the statute; 66 it
may fashion remedies appropriate to the needs of each case; 67 or it
may determine what remedial measures are best suited to neutralize
the unfair labor practices which have occurred. 68 The Board has the
power to take appropriate steps to nullify the effect of an employer's
illegal conduct and to prevent its enjoyment of any advantage gained
thereby.6 9 Finally, the Board has no power nor right to promulgate
orders which are essentially punitive in nature.70
How CEASE AND DESIST POWERS CAN CURE THE ILLS OF THE EEOC
At the outset, it must be understood that cease and desist powers
will not act as a panacea for all the EEOC's problems. Nevertheless,
the addition of these powers will more than substantially help the
Commission attain the ideal for which it was created.
The conferring of cease and desist powers will greatly increase the
investigative powers of the Commission. When the Commission has
reliable information that an employer or union is indulging in illegal
conduct, it will no longer have to wait for an individual to bring the
action through a formal charge. In this manner, the EEOC can
62. Sims v. Stuart, 291 F. 707, (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
63. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Cross, 171 F. 480 (W.D. Okla. 1910).
64. May Dept. Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
65. Phelphs Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
66. NLRB v. Coats and Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1957).
67. Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 321
F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1963).
68. Indiana Metal Products Co. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
69. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1944).
70. NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Local 823, 227 F.2d 439 (1955).
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function like other effective administrative agencies such as the NLRB,
ICC, or the FCC. An employer or union will not be able to strongarm
its employees or members and ride roughshod over their statutory
rights.
Since under cease and desist powers the individual remedies will
be secondary to the public interest served by the Commission, all
employees and members will have a substantial interest in the outcome
of any case against his or her employer. Furthermore, because of such
an overall involvement, the fear of personal reprisal is not likely to
be as great in inhibiting other individuals from action. Unified action
by a substantial number of employees would encourage others to
action, not only in the same plant or industry, but employees in
similar or related fields could also become motivated. Affirmative
results for complainants will help minority group members come to
the realization that the law supports them, thus freeing them from
fear of losing a job, receiving a lower salary, or being blacklisted in
their respective occupations. To instill faith in the law among people
living under the social and numerous other injustices of the day is
something this country urgently needs. Cease and desist powers will
add to Title VII that missing element whose absence has plagued the
Commission from its inception. Faith in the law is difficult to measure,
but the end results will manifest themselves tangibly. To be more
specific, an examination of some typical situations which confront
the EEOC and its subsequent handling of these cases is relevant at
this point.
X, an industrious non-union employee in a non-union plant, with
somewhere between 50-100 employees, was hired in 1960. He works
eight years as a clerk making small advancements during that period.
A promotional opportunity occurs and X applies for the position. In
spite of his ample qualifications and seniority rights, X is passed over
and an outsider is hired for the job. The only recognizable difference
between X, and the outsider is that X is Spanish-American. What can
X do right now under the Civil Rights Act to redress his apparent
grievance? He can file a claim with the EEOC and possibly wait two to
three years for the Commission to decide if he has been discriminated
against. Then, he can wait another one to five months to see if an
agreement can be reached between himself and his employer. If no
agreement is reached, he is in no better position than when he origi-
nally filed the complaint. But even if he is successful, can the Coin-
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mission expect that his effort will motivate others to similar action?
The answer lies in how well the other employees will be able to
finance the great economic burden of such a venture. The answer also
depends upon whether they can withstand the almost certain employer
pressures and coercion that will follow.
How will cease and desist powers help the minority group em-
ployees such as X? First, the time period will be cut, at least, in half
in most cases. The eventual remedy the employee will receive will
not be arrived at during a closed door session with his employer in the
employer's office, but will be received before a public Commission
empowered to see that the law is obeyed, or in the impartial chambers
of a courtroom. The minority group member's weapon is now equal
or even greater than his adversary. Moreover, via a "blanket clause"
which would empower the Commission to outlaw future discrimina-
tory acts of similar nature, the eradication of discriminatory practices
toward other employees would result, assuming the facts of the case
necessitate such an order. The blanket clause would erase the necessity
for further suit by other employees, and thereby, drastically reduce
the Commission's case load. An easing of the Commission's case burden
would release the machinery of the EEOC to allot more time to care-
fully scrutinizing other cases. Finally, it is submitted that cease and
desist powers would adequately protect minority group members from
similar discriminatory behavior in the future.
Another typical situation of employment discrimination is where a
group of females have applied for a particular job but none are hired,
despite the fact they are physically capable of doing the work. One
or several of the women files a complaint with the EEOC. After wait-
ing approximately the same time period as described earlier, and
receiving similar treatment, the best the women can expect to receive
is a job, usually at a lower pay rate, while the employment pattern
and discriminatory practices of the employer remain substantially
unchanged for future applicants. Cease and desist powers acting in
their capacity as a mandatory injunction, could command a positive
act, thus guaranteeing the complainants a job if they were discrimi-
nated against, and insuring a salary commensurate with their ability.
Such power utilized in this manner not only benefits the aggrieved
parties, but in the long run, the public and industry become the real
beneficiaries. Many different orders may be fashioned through cease
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and desist powers to fit the individual needs of each case. This fact
alone, is a compelling reason for conferring such powers on the EEOC.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that with the addition of the recommendations pre-
viously mentioned, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
could become a most effective tool in transforming the concept of
equality in employment opportunity from the theoretical into a
practicable reality. With the addition of cease and desist powers, the
machinery of the EEOC would no longer be slow and laborious. The
case loads would be substantially reduced. The public interest in
eradicating discrimination would be one step closer to actuality. At
least, the legislature would have done its part; the rest would be up
to the people discriminated against. The Commission would no longer
merely slap violators on the wrist, and the ridiculous concept of
voluntary compliance would be firmly repudiated. The final step in
the enforcement process would emanate from the Commission having
adequate financial resources to handle all cases. The individual would
not have to fear the loss of substantial financial resources while the
case advances through the courts. Lastly, minimum evidentiary re-
quirements would be raised to the level discussed earlier. Where
purported violations would be found, they would be backed by sub-
stantial evidence, thus insuring fundamental fairness to all parties
concerned.
There can be no doubt after analyzing the nature of cease and
desist powers that they would act as a deterrent to further violations
of the Civil Rights Act. Furthermore, they would put necessary
strength into Title VII so that the purposes of the Act might better
be attained, rather than remaining empty governmental promises.
They would give the EEOC the kind of power that is a necessary
prerequisite for any regulatory agency. Cease and desist legislation, if
passed by Congress, would tell millions of Americans that the Federal
government stands ready to defend their lawful requests for equal
opportunity in employment. Any legislation which grants less than
cease and desist authority to the EEOC is a cruel hoax on minorities.
If this authority is granted, every complainant will have the backing
of a federal administrative agency armed with discretion to impose a
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court enforceable mandate. Legislation which barely improves the lot
of those who have suffered abuse for so long, only serves to heighten
the frustration so many feel today; frustration emanating from prom-
ises stated in law but not enforceable in fact.
It has been clearly established that the most rapid and equitable
remedies that can be offered by an administrative agency are only
attained when that agency can issue enforceable orders. Minorities
have been patient long enough. Paper pledges are insufficient-the
full force of the law is required.7'
ELMER S. BEATTY
71. Testimony before Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare, by Clifford
Alexander, Member EEOC, Aug. 11, 1969.
